FORCES COMMAND

HURRICANE ANDREW RESPONSE

JTF ANDREW AAR

JOINT TASK FORCE ANDREW
AFTER ACTION REPORT
OVERVIEW EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

VOLUME I

Joint Task Force Andrew
After Action Report (AAR)

VOLUME I

1. Introduction. Volume I of the AAR provides a broad overview of JTF operations based on the analysis of joint assessment topics as they apply across the joint spectrum. The joint assessment topics used for the analysis are listed below:

a. DOD, Federal/State/Local Civil Agencies, and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) Interoperability

b. Joint Command and Control

c. Health Care

d. Logistics

e. Communications and Automation

f. Engineer Operations and Sustainment

g. Military Police/Physical Security

h. Joint Airspace Management

i. Joint Transportation Operations and Sustainment

j. PAO/PIO Operations

k. Transition (Military and Civilian)

l. JTF Functions, Evolution, and Development

m. Accountability

n. Safety

2. The JTF AAR Team assisted by Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) assigned by all service components compiled a strawman report based on observations and interviews related to the joint assessment topics for the JTF General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) review. The GOSC reviewed all data and provided input for the final report. The final report is entitled Joint Task Force Andrew Overview Executive Summary.

government to provide assistance to a State and its affected local governments during major disasters. The FRP describes the basic mechanisms and structure by which the Federal government will mobilize resources and conduct activities to augment State and local response efforts. Though not identified by the Stafford Act, the FRP specifies the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as the lead Federal agency responsible for coordinating the overall delivery of federal assistance.

DOD Directive 3025.1 (DRAFT) provided the guidance for DOD elements to comply with the provisions of The Stafford Act. Some important parts of the DOD directive are:

a. State and local resources should be applied first.

b. DOD resources are provided only when response or recovery requirements are beyond the capabilities of civil authorities as determined by FEMA.

c. Military operations have priority over MSCA unless otherwise directed by SECDEF and therefore, DOD disaster relief forces must be released as soon as possible.

d. DOD forces employed in MSCA activities shall remain under military command and control.

e. Active Component military is not used for law enforcement.

The DOD mission began with a tasking from CINCFOR to Second U.S. Army to appoint a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) prior to the landfall of Hurricane Andrew. In accordance with the Second U.S. Army Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) plan and the Federal Response Plan, the DCO was appointed and his advanced Emergency Response Team (ERT-A) deployed on 23 August 1992 to the Florida State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Tallahassee, Florida and began coordination with the FEMA appointed Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) and his ERT-A teams which represented the Emergency Support Functions (ESF) deployed to facilitate the Federal emergency response. Also assembled in the Florida State EOC were the Governor and his State counterparts to the Federal ESFs.

At 0500 on the 24th of August, Hurricane Andrew made landfall in Florida. FEMA and Florida officials made a Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA) to document the disaster severity and establish a foundation for Governor Chiles to request Federal assistance. Governor Chiles had to declare that Florida's resources were inadequate to respond to the emergency. By design, this request included a damage estimate, an inventory of State resources committed, what specific type of assistance was desired, and a certification of cost sharing. At 1300 on 24 August, the

President declared the three counties of Dade, Monroe, and Broward to be disaster areas.

At 1530 on 24 August, FEMA notified the Director of Military Support (DOMS) of Florida's disaster declaration. At 1610, the Secretary of the Army, as Executive Agent, issued an execute order for DOD to proceed with disaster relief operations. At 2130 CINCFOR released the execute order to Second U.S. Army, the Continental Army with Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) responsibility for Florida. On 25 Aug 92, LTG Samuel Ebbesen, Second U.S. Army Commander, deployed to Tallahassee, Florida to link up with FEMA and Florida emergency officials. At 1740 on 27 August, the President ordered an increased DOD role in the disaster zone. The Joint Task Force Andrew (JTFA) was established with LTG Ebbesen the designated JTF Commander. LTG Ebbesen directed his Second U.S. Army staff to deploy to Miami and form the cadre for the organization of the JTF headquarters and establish liaison in the disaster area with the Florida National Guard (FLNG) already deployed there. Personnel requirements to expand the JTF headquarters beyond the Second U.S. Army Headquarters assets were initially filled from Second U.S. Army Readiness Groups and advisory assets with shortfall forwarded to FORSCOM.

For Hurricane Andrew, FEMA appointed the Director of FEMA Region IV, Mr. Major P. May, as FCO. As such, he was the senior Federal official on site until the arrival of the Secretary of Transportation, the Honorable Andrew H. Card who served as the President's representative for the Presidential Task Force. The Presidential Task Force was an anomaly for disaster relief operations, but emphasized the President's concern for the disaster relief efforts in Florida and required close coordination between Secretary Card, FEMA, and Commander, JTFA.

The FCO assessed the most urgent needs for disaster response and recovery, devised strategies to meet those needs, and tasked Federal agencies to perform missions outlined in the FRP and additional missions not specifically addressed in the plan. Florida appointed one State Coordinating Officer (SCO), Mr. Robert Nave. The SCO was the state's counterpart to the FCO. Initially working out of the State of Florida Emergency Operations Center in Tallahassee the Disaster Field Office (DFO) was subsequently moved to the former Eastern Airlines Building at Miami International Airport. The State subsequently collocated its EOC with FEMA in Miami. All Federal agencies involved in disaster recovery operated out of this DFO.

2. MISSION/CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: The Joint Task Force was to provide humanitarian support by establishing field feeding sites, storage/distribution warehousing, cargo transfer operations, local/line haul transportation operations, and other logistical support to the local population.

JTF Commander's Intent

Immediately begin to operate feeding and water facilities; priority to the cities of Homestead and Florida City, and the Cutler Ridge area. After a more detailed assessment, expand operations throughout the affected area. Provide assistance to other Federal agencies, State and local governments, and organizations in receipt, storage, and distribution of supplies and equipment. DO NOT engage in law enforcement actions or operations without approval of CG, JTFA. End state is to get life support systems in place and relieve initial hardships until non-DOD, State and local agencies can reestablish normal operations throughout the AO.

Concept of Operations

The JTF simultaneously operated in three Areas of Operations (AO), with forces centered on the communities in existence prior to the disaster, incorporating all available support systems across a broad front.

The objectives were to make the communities an integral part of the recovery process, thus facilitating return to normalcy, and to enhance communication and coordination. Mayors and local city and county officials had military counterparts (commanders and civil affairs teams). The rapid initial response of the JTF focused on providing food and water, shelter, sanitation, medical supplies and services, and transportation with the objective of easing the suffering.

JTF Andrew operations were conducted in three phases:

Phase I: Relief Phase - Provided immediate life support systems--food and water, shelter, medical supplies and services, sanitation, and transportation.

Phase II: Recovery Phase - Ensured sustainment of those services provided in Phase I while assisting Federal, State, and local authorities within our capabilities to establish public services.

Phase III: Reconstitution - Continued reestablishment of services under control of non-DOD Federal, State, and local governments while JTF Andrew redeployed.

3. **METHODOLOGY:** JTF Andrew After Action Report (AAR). The JTF Andrew AAR Team was established on 6 September 1992 with the mission of collecting observations from joint operations in support of Hurricane Andrew relief efforts. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), were assigned to the AAR Team to facilitate a broad overview of major Joint Assessment Topics as follows:

Joint Assessment Topics

-DOD, Federal/State/Local Civil Agencies, and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) Interoperability.
-Joint Command and Control
-Health Care
-Logistics
-Communications and Automation
-Engineer Operations and Sustainment
-Military Police/Physical Security
-Joint Airspace Management
-Joint Transportation Operations and Sustainment
-PAO/PIO Operations
-Transition (Military and Civilian)
-JTF Functions Evolution and Development
-Accountability
-Safety

In addition to the SME's broad assessment topics, the component commanders, task force commanders, and primary and special JTF staff were assigned tabs for reporting unique topics/issues that pertained to their specific areas.

The Joint Universal Lesson Learned System (JULLS) is the primary information management tool which was used in the collection of data/observations. Supporting JULLS Observation Worksheets reflect observations and interviews from all levels of the operations, i.e., individual soldier to the commander. Although systemic problems and issues are noted, care must be taken to consider the perspective of the JULLS observation.

4. MAJOR AREAS AND FINDINGS. The following Joint Task Force Andrew (JTFA) Overview addresses 14 areas of interest relative to the participation by the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and Canadian Forces during the conduct of joint operations supporting the humanitarian relief to victims of Hurricane Andrew. The areas of interest are referred to as joint assessment topics and summarize the issues from a Joint Task Force Andrew perspective. Specific details and observations as identified by each reporting element are contained in the tabbed portions of this report.

A synopsis of the joint assessment topics follows:

a. DOD, FEDERAL/STATE/LOCAL CIVIL AGENCIES, AND PRIVATE VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS (PVO) INTEROPERABILITY: Many of the participants in the relief effort lacked familiarity with other agencies' equipment, operational procedures, and capabilities in providing relief support. This occurred primarily in three areas: Active Component military, other than those assigned to Second U.S. Army and certain others, possessed inadequate knowledge of the Federal Response Plan; inadequate knowledge of the damage assessment capability of the military by Federal and

State agencies; and lack of an effective command and control system for the PVOs to coordinate their actions in the disaster area with federal agencies.

The FRP describes mechanisms and structures by which the Federal government, under direction of FEMA as the lead Federal agency, mobilizes resources and conducts activities to augment State and local response elements.

To facilitate the provision of emergency assistance, the FRP adopts a functional approach. In essence, it groups the types of Federal assistance that a state is most likely to need under 12 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). Each ESF is headed by a primary agency, but is supported by other Federal or non-Federal agencies. Each ESF, in coordination with the FCO and the state, is responsible for providing assistance in its functional area. DOD is the lead agency for ESF #9, Urban Search and Rescue, and ESF #3, Public Works and Engineering. DOD is a supporting agency for the remaining ten ESFs.

As delineated in the FRP, DOD resources were to be used for specific missions in support of other Federal agencies assigned primary ESF roles. Additional DOD resources were only to be used when it was evident ESF primary agencies were unable to accomplish their assigned missions, and FEMA would then directly task DOD for support.

For example, under the FRP, the American Red Cross (ESF #6, Mass Care) had the primary function of sheltering disaster victims. However, in this disaster since there was such a tremendous requirement for emergency shelter, FEMA tasked DOD to erect tent shelters. This shelter requirement ultimately resulted in the development of Life Support Centers (LSCs) which appropriately consisted of the following features: Mobile Kitchen Trailers (MKTs), tents, lights, floors, cots, showers, porto-lets, bedding, child care, medical services, recreation, laundry, and administrative services. The basic interoperability issue is the coordination required between DOD and FEMA which details specific operations to be performed by DOD elements and provides the quantitative parameters which determine mission completion.

This critical coordination step was insufficient during the early stages of this operation and resulted in the extension of DOD into mission areas for which other federal agencies were responsible.

b. JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL: The magnitude of the disaster drives the force structure required to provide the DOD response for disaster relief. In the case of a disaster as severe as Hurricane Andrew a JTF is required. The Continental United States Army (CONUSA) is the optimum headquarters to serve as the

nucleus for the initial JTF organization. Joint doctrine must be developed to provide operational procedures and contingency TDAs that reflect specific positions to support the organization and functions of a joint headquarters. Joint doctrine must address the capabilities of all services to respond to humanitarian relief missions and provide possible JTF organizational models. Joint Task Force Andrew provides an initial model for study and development of Joint Doctrine and TDAs that may support a workable command and control solution for future operations of this nature. (enclosures 1, 2, & 2a) The Army, Navy, and Air Force were organized into component Task Forces commanded by the CG, JTFA, while the U.S. Marine Corps Force (MARFOR) was OPCON to ARFOR. Future operations may call for the MARFOR to be under the direct command of the JTF. A Special Operations coordinating element needs to be included at the JTF level to facilitate employment of Joint Special Operations Forces (SOF) capabilities in support of this type of mission. The breakout of the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) Logistic Support Group (LSG) as a separate Task Force directly under the CG, JTFA, enhanced the command and control of the wholesale logistics operation. Component LNOs provided critical coordination and information flow to the JTFA headquarters further enhancing the command and control process.

c. HEALTH CARE: Military medicine played a major supporting role in the Federal relief effort and accepted this role as an implied task based upon the President's 27 August announcement of increased DOD assistance. That this medical role included hands-on care of civilians was reinforced by the Army Chief of Staff during his visit to Fort Bragg in the initial phases of the deployment. Direct taskings from FEMA included specific requests for support to the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), medical logistical support for civilians, specialty support for large and small animal care, and water sampling support for wells. All other care and assistance was provided within the framework of Health and Human Services as the lead agency for Emergency Support Function #8 (Health & Medical) and with a Public Health Service Officer designated by the President as the director of the Federal medical effort.

The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) was activated for Hurricane Andrew and the deployment of two non-DOD DMATs began immediately. The DMATs were not equipped or supplied for sustained operations but this problem was overcome by DOD resources. Fifteen DMATs would eventually be deployed. The medical effort was managed within the following functional areas.

Command & Control: The military provided organizational support to the White House designated Public Health Service Officer, the defacto lead for ESF 8, by collocating the headquarters of the 44th Medical Brigade with the Management

Support Unit (Forward) in the disaster area. There was a lack of familiarity of services and capabilities available from other Federal medical agencies. Each task force component should have a designated medical point of contact to act as a component medical adviser.

Treatment: Area medical coverage was provided by divisional medical assets, two area support medical companies from the 44th Medical Brigade, two medical companies from the Florida Army National Guard (FLARNG), and a 20-cot medical triage facility from the MARFOR. Support was drawn down as civilian sources of care became reestablished. Adequate civilian hospital beds were available in the greater Miami area throughout the effort even though a combat support hospital was available to augment if needed. Some providers expressed concern as to whether they could provide medical care to disaster relief workers. The Office of The Surgeon General, as well as the Office of the General Counsel, FEMA, have taken the position that medical care could be provided to such personnel. To eliminate the present ambiguity, it may be desirable to amend the Stafford Act in this area.

Medical Logistics: Civilian agencies and local infrastructure were unable to control and organize massive shipments of donated medical supplies. The 32d Medical Logistics Battalion assumed this mission and, working with the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, supplied both civilian and military customers with Class VIII (Medical) supplies required for humanitarian support. Geriatric and pediatric medications that were not on the military stockage lists became available to military providers through this mechanism.

Mental Health: State officials were supported by a military consultant who orchestrated the use of divisional mental health teams to collect data in the neighborhoods to target State mental health teams providing early intervention.

A Navy Special Psychiatric Rapid Intervention Team (SPRINT) provided crisis intervention in conjunction with civilian mental health workers until the mission could be adequately assumed by the normal means.

Preventive Medicine: Military preventive medicine specialists arrived early and were coordinated through a Preventive Medicine task force initially headed up by a PHS captain and ultimately chaired by the HRS environmental science officer for Dade County. All services provided assets to this effort. The Air Force Reserve mosquito spray missions illustrated the importance of coordination. Public affairs, air space management, and environmental concerns all had to be addressed.

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 02355-23900 (00006), submitted by FORSCOM FCJ3, LTC Makowski, 367-6527, (404)669-6527.

2. (U) Operation HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF conducted by CINCFOR on 08/24/92.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: RWO (REAL WORLD OPS), USA (US ARMY), USAF (US AIR FORCE), USN (US NAVY), USMC (US MARINE CORPS), URBAN, ADVERSE WEATHER, RESERVE COMPONENT, OPERATIONS, SOF (SPECIAL OPS FORCES), LOGISTICS, SUPPLY, TRANSPORTATION, AIRLIFT, SEALIFT, SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM, ASSESSMENT, HARRICAND RELIEF.

4. (U) TITLE: ASSESSMENT - Receipt, Storage, and Distribution of Relief Supplies.

5. (U) OBSERVATION: Although no logistics doctrine for disaster relief existed, military logisticians successfully handled enormous amounts of civilian humanitarian goods and military relief supplies. They established and ran depots to receipt, account for, store, and distribute humanitarian goods and military supplies.

6. (U) DISCUSSION:

a. (U) The initial logistics challenge was met by the 1st Corps Support Command (COSCOM). 1st COSCOM handled humanitarian goods distribution concurrent with supporting deployed Joint Task Forces (JTF) force. However, the rapidly increasing flow of humanitarian goods and military supplies required an expanded depot system.

b. (U) The U. S. Army Material Command (AMC) formed a Logistics Support Group (LSG) to establish and operate a depot system. The LSG used a main depot and two forward depots to receipt, store, and distribute donated and federal goods. These depots supported military, federal, and civilian organizations. Over 1000 soldiers and DOD civilians and up to 40,000 volunteers worked to unload trucks, sort donations, pelletize goods, and distribute them.

c. (U) The Navy played a primary role in food supply. The USS Sylvania (AFS 2) supplied over 1.9 thousand tons of food supplies to mobile Kitchen trailers (MKT). Marine CH-46 helicopters, using external loads, provided fresh products to 22 MKTs on a daily basis. Over 120 Army, and Marine helicopters flew 5,816 hours hauling 3.5 million pounds of cargo.

7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: None. This lesson is an assessment.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: None.

9. (U) COMMENTS: (02355-23900)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, FORCES COMMAND
FORT MCPHERSON, GA 30330-6000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

FCJ3-OX (525n)

20 November 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310-0101

SUBJECT: CINCFOR Hurricane Andrew After Action Report (AAR)

1. Reference, Joint Publication 1-03.30, 15 Apr 91, Joint After Action Reporting System.

2. Enclosed is the FORSCOM AAR on Hurricane Andrew response. It includes summaries and lessons learned from Headquarters, FORSCOM, and subordinate and supporting commands: JTF-A, Fifth Army, LANTCOM, TRANSCOM, and the Defense Logistics Agency.

3. The AAR consists of four parts. Part 1 is the Executive Summary with discussion of major issues and problem areas. Part 2 is the FORSCOM Summary Joint Universal Lessons Learned (JULL) with assessments of operation objectives per above reference. Part 3 is a JULLs Title Listing and Significant Interest JULLs. Part 4 is supporting and subordinate command JULLs.

4. Hurricane Andrew struck the area of south Miami on the morning of 24 August 1992 and two days later struck Louisiana. The devastation was significant in Louisiana but not nearly as catastrophic as the densely populated areas that were hit in southern Dade County, Florida. Both areas were declared federal disaster areas by President Bush, but the majority of our efforts and the main thrust of this report are oriented toward the operation in Florida.

5. Once alerted federal forces responded quickly. Assessment of the catastrophic devastation caused the commitment to soon expand past the initial logistical task force. Within two weeks there were over 23,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, DoD civilians and Canadians involved under the command of LTG Sam Ebbesen. By all measures they did a magnificent job for the people of south Dade county and the families of Homestead Air Force Base. Their rapid response has enhanced the reputation of America's military men and women.

FORCES COMMAND

HURRICANE ANDREW RESPONSE

AFTER ACTION REPORT

PART 1

11/16/92

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 02957-01310 (00001), submitted by FORSCOM FCJ3, LTC Makowski, 367-6527, (404)669-6527.

2. (U) Operation HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF conducted by CINCFOR on 08/24/92.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: RWO (REAL WORLD OPS), USA (US ARMY), USAF (US AIR FORCE), USN (US NAVY), USMC (US MARINE CORPS), ADVERSE WEATHER, MILITARY SERVICE HQ, SPECIFIED COMMAND, C2 (COMMAND AND CONTROL), OPERATIONS, SOF (SPECIAL OPS FORCES), DTTP (DOC, TAC, TECH, PR), SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM, HURRICANE RELIEF, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, FEMA, FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN.

4. (U) TITLE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - CINCFOR Hurricane Andrew Relief (Part 1 of 3 Parts).

5. (U) INTRODUCTION. This After Action Report is in four parts. Part 1 is the Executive Summary with discussion of major issues and problem areas. Part 2 is the FORSCOM Summary JULL with assessments of operation objectives. Part 3 is a JULLS Title Listing and Significant Interest JULLS. Part 4 is supporting and subordinate command JULLS.

6. (U) BACKGROUND. Hurricane Andrew was the nation's worst national disaster in terms of financial loss and property damage. Hurricane Andrew first came ashore 24 Aug 92 south of Miami, FL. It continued across the southern tip of Florida and entered the Gulf of Mexico. It then turned north and made landfall a second time, 26 Aug 92, near Morgan City, LA. The hurricane devastated the south Miami area and caused significant damage in Louisiana.

a. (U) As a result of damage in Florida, the President declared a major disaster and authorized federal relief to affected counties. Louisiana was subsequently included in the disaster declaration. The Secretary of the Army, as the DOD Executive Agent, designated CINCFOR as the Operating Agent and Supported CINC for disaster relief operations. CINCFOR was given the mission to conduct disaster relief in support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency IAW the Federal Response Plan. CINCFOR was responsible for supporting all Emergency Support Functions (ESF) except for Public Works and Engineering which is the responsibility of the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).

b. (U) Although there was significant damage in Louisiana, damage was not as catastrophic as the damage in Florida. The storm went through a less heavily populated area then it did in Florida. The state of Louisiana was better prepared and responded quicker. This resulted in reduced requests for DOD support in Louisiana. No major units were employed in Louisiana. CINCFOR's operations centered on relief and

recovery operations in Florida.

c. (U) CINCFOR's relief operations involved over 24,000 U. S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Canadian Forces deployed to Florida in the largest peacetime CONUS deployment. Forces successfully completed 99 FEMA taskings during the period 24 August to 15 October. Forces cleared six million cubic yards of debris; constructed and operated four life support centers; established and operated three depots and a donated goods reception point to receive, store, and dispense humanitarian goods; provided 67,000 civilians with medical care; and repaired 98 schools.

7. (U) MAJOR ISSUES AND PROBLEM AREAS. CINCFOR's response to the devastation in Florida and Louisiana was a huge success. Forces from all services and the Canadians provided professional and timely relief to the victims of the hurricane. The military again proved it is a capable, trained, and ready force. Given no or little time to prepare and working with mission type orders, forces proved they are able to serve the nation with distinction. Hurricane Andrew relief operations were a great success. But, as with all operations, there are areas which require further review or discussion to see how they can be improved.

a. (U) DOD's CATASTROPHIC DISASTER ROLE.

(1) (U) Recent catastrophic disasters, e.g., Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew, required greater military response than currently envisioned in the Federal Response Plan (FRP). While DOD is the lead federal agency for two Emergency Support Functions (ESF), i.e., Public Works and Engineering, and Urban Search and Rescue, it supports all other ESFs. But during Hurricane Andrew relief, DOD provided the initial response forces for many ESFs.

(2) (U) Many agencies have technical personnel and expertise, but no large pools of manpower they can rapidly draw upon to provide the massive support required in a catastrophic disaster. Most agencies rely upon contracting to provide services and support. In a catastrophic disaster where rapid and massive support is required, they are overwhelmed. DOD becomes the principle initial response agency.

(3) (U) DOD has the organization and ability to provide rapid, massive initial relief, but it does not now have the mission to do so. If DOD and FORSCOM are expected to provide the initial response in a catastrophic disaster, ours and FEMA's plans need to reflect DOD's initial response requirements.

(4) (U) Faster response is needed than occurred in Florida. The initial grid lock among local, county, state, and

federal governments delayed massive response 2-3 days. In the case of a catastrophic earthquake, many lives could have been lost while awaiting aid. We need provisions for an automatic response to a catastrophic disaster. Based on preestablished criteria, we would begin automatically responding until directed otherwise. For example, any category 4 or 5 hurricane hitting a populous area or any 7.0 earthquake in a populous area would trigger an automatic federal and DOD response.

(5) (U) Supporting JULLS: 00657-57960, 00750-28698, and 00536-72702.

b. (U) DETERMINATION OF MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

(1) (U) After the military is involved, we need criteria for mission accomplishment. When should forces be released from continuing recovery or reconstitution work? There is no guidance when the military portion of disaster response should end.

(2) (U) After the military has massively responded, there is some tendency by lead ESF agencies to continue to rely upon DOD to provide support. Without a clear understanding by all of the end-state for military operations, full assumption of continuing ESF responsibilities by the lead federal agencies may be delayed. Early on the Defense Coordination Officer (DCO) or the JTF Commander must obtain agreement with the Federal Coordination Officer (FCO) on the goals or the end state of military response.

(3) (U) The 10th Mountain Division identified ten areas of involvement of military assistance. It then developed desired end states by response phase. These desired end states formed the bases for the political decisions to release military forces.

(4) (U) We need to develop the end state matrix formulated by 10th Mountain Division and incorporate it into national level, operational level, and tactical strategies. Realizing each disaster is unique, this end state concept can form the basis of establishing mission accomplishment criteria for specific disasters.

(5) (U) Supporting JULLS: 92608-83125 and 00546-52826.

c. (U) LACK OF DISASTER RELIEF DOCTRINE.

(1) (U) Joint and service disaster relief doctrine is nonexistent. Little guidance is available at any level on how to organize and conduct humanitarian relief operations in general, and disaster relief operations in particular.

(2) (U) The Federal Response Plan is not readily available below Unified and Specified Command and CONUSA levels. In any case, it provides little information on conduct of disaster relief operations. DOD Directive 3025.1, Use of Military Resources During Peacetime Civil Emergencies, is dated 23 May 80. Written before the DOD reorganization and the establishment of FORSCOM as a Specified Command, it is not current. A revised DOD Dir 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities, is still in draft. AR 500-60, Disaster Relief, is dated 1 Aug 81 and is also not current. No joint or Army doctrinal publications exist.

(3) (U) The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) identified this deficiency during their development of the JTF Andrew After Action Report. We need to not only develop Army doctrine, we need to develop joint doctrine. All services need doctrine on humanitarian relief operations.

(4) (U) We also need better disaster relief plans. Current plans are focused on Urban Search and Rescue. We are undertaking development of a Domestic Emergencies plan. This plan will cover response to catastrophic disasters and not just Urban Search and Rescue.

(5) (U) Supporting JULLS: 91450-30796, 91467-22748, 00251-31727, 00536-72702, and 91646-83919.

d. (U) USE OF RESERVE PERSONNEL AND FORCES.

(1) (U) We need better access to Reserve Component (RC) forces from all services. Title 10 USC 673b currently prohibits the involuntary call-up of reserve forces to conduct disaster relief operations. We need to work to get this and other restrictions changed.

(2) (U) RC personnel, units, and equipment are valuable assists for conduct of disaster relief operations. RC units located in the vicinity of the disaster, as was the 841st Engr Bn in Miami, can provide manpower, equipment, liaison with the community, and knowledge of the community. In other cases, the use of RC forces is critical. As is the case of Civil Affairs units, a substantial portion of some units only exist in the RC. We need access to them.

(3) (U) Relying on volunteers to perform unit missions results in ad hoc units. Even when the ad hoc unit is composed of volunteers form the same unit, problems exist. First line supervisors and leaders, when they are available, end up leading soldiers not normally assigned to them.

(4) (U) As the active forces draw down, greater reliance

must be placed on the RC. We need to be able to involuntary call up individuals or units if the situation requires. As with the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up, it will be used only in the gravest situations.

(5) (U) Supporting JULLS: 00932-14596 and 92366-19499.

--- (U) SUBJECT: OPERATIONS

--- (U) INTEROPERABILITY: JTTP

--- (U) Action managed by: DOMS, action worked by: , RAP number: . Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

in peace time and kept on the shelf. Also, a potential bidders list nationwide would be prepared and kept up-to-date for use in any emergency. These contracts could be awarded by DOD in coordination with FEMA or by primary ESF administrators.

(5) (U) The development of "push packages" of forces and supplies along with provisions for automatic response will speed military response. We should consider a goal to have significant assistance on the ground within 72 hours after the disaster. Initial aid, e. g., search and rescue teams, medical support, and life support, should arrive with 24 hours.

(6) (U) Supporting JULLs: 00745-94017, 00540-45696, 00136-37292, 02254-95383, 00657-57960, 00750-28689, and 21077-83123.

f. (U) ENGINEER OPERATIONS AND SUSTAINMENT.

(1) (U) The DOD relief effort was the largest joint and combined engineer effort ever assembled to assist in the relief, recovery and reconstitution efforts. The engineer force consisted of Army, Air Force, and Marine engineer units, the Navy Seabees, Canadian military engineers, and United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) employees and contractors. The military engineer effort grew to a peak of 3,500 military personnel, 600 USACE employees, and over 4,000 contractor personnel.

(2) (U) Military engineers filled the void until contractors, volunteer relief organizations, and local communities could be mobilized to carry on with disaster recovery. Appointing a USACE Division Engineer (BG Fuhrman) as the JTF Engineer and using an active duty engineer group (36th Engineer Group) as the JTF engineer staff ensured the synchronization of the USACE (ESF #3) and JTF engineer effort. It also provided the JTF Commander with an expert in contracting of engineering services (USACE).

(3) (U) Engineer forces flowed into the area of operations based on individual service component estimates of what was needed rather than an accurate engineer reconnaissance and assessment. Had an accurate engineer assessment been accomplished in the first 12-24 hours of the disaster, synchronized engineer recovery effort could have been brought to bear much earlier. Earlier deployment of the engineer group into the area of operations could have alleviated this situation.

(4) (U) We are looking at having Active Component CONUS Engineer Groups establish a working relationship with the CONUSA staff in their geographical areas. This pre-disaster planning and coordination will pay dividends in future crises. This is

of MSCA missions.

(5) (U) Supporting JULLs: 02261-35150, 01943-19922, 91571-29735, and 91635-03944.

g. (U) JTF ESTABLISHMENT, ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY.

(1) (U) No type JTF HQ structure was available to aid in the establishment of a JTF HQ for Hurricane Andrew response operations. This lack of JTF HQ template hindered the rapid establishment of the JTF HQ. Additionally, the filling of personnel requirements without line numbers created numerous problems and made accountability of personnel extremely difficult.

(2) (U) A type JTF organization structure with positions identified by line numbers needs to be established and included in the FORSCOM Catastrophic Disaster Plan. We are working on developing a type JTF organization structure.

(3) (U) Supporting JULLs: 00236-03535 and 02359-91497.

h. (U) HEALTH CARE.

(1) (U) Early assessment of Health Care needs is critical to providing the required support. ESF 8 provides for Public Health Service (PHS) taking the lead in mobilizing and deploying an assessment team. DOD medical assets must be part of any assessment team including a Disaster Assistance Survey Team (DSAT) or a FORSCOM assessment team.

(2) (U) Joint Medical Planners exist at each CONUSA with the experience in conducting medical disaster relief operations and in working daily with Regional FEMA offices, state agencies, the PHS, and the Veterans Association (VA). Early augmentation of any type organizational Joint structure from the CONUSA Joint Medical Mobilization Offices is a must. Any Catastrophic Disaster Response Plan which creates functional task forces must include one for medical.

(3) (U) There was difficulty in providing resources to the JTF Surgeon and tracking all medical personnel and issues. CINCFOR's role and authority as the supported CINC must be clearly spelled out, and continually reinforced to all supporting commands and agencies.

(4) (U) CINCFOR, working with the CONUSA or JTF, must begin early on to develop criteria to determine mission success and establish appropriate points for the transition of the DOD medical infrastructure to civilian control.

(5) (U) Supporting JULLs: 02254-95383, 02358-01252, and 00546-52826.

--- (U) SUBJECT: OPERATIONS

--- (U) INTEROPERABILITY: JTTP

--- (U) Action managed by: DOMS, action worked by: , RAP number: . Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 10455-21830 (00003), submitted by FORSCOM FCJ3, LTC Makowski, 367-6527, (404)669-6527.

2. (U) Operation HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF conducted by CINCFOR on 08/24/92.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: RWO (REAL WORLD OPS), USA (US ARMY), USAF (US AIR FORCE), USN (US NAVY), USMC (US MARINE CORPS), ADVERSE WEATHER, MILITARY SERVICE HQ, SPECIFIED COMMAND, TASK ORGANIZATION, MANPOWER & PERSONNEL, OPERATIONS, SOF (SPECIAL OPS FORCES), JDS (JT DEPLOYMENT SYS), LOGISTICS, DTTP (DOC, TAC, TECH, PR), SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM, HURRICANE RELIEF, EXESUTIVE SUMMARY.

4. (U) TITLE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - CINCFOR Hurricane Andrew Relief (Part 3 of 3 Parts).

h. (U) OPERATIONAL CONCERNS.

(1) (U) There appeared to be a general lack of knowledge at all levels about the capabilities and use of the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES). At times it seemed unresponsive and cumbersome as a planning/execution tool, mainly due to misunderstandings as to what data was required, how the information was inputted into the system, and how the system was used to plan, schedule, and track events. USCINCTRANS and other CINCs use the system almost exclusively to track movements; FORSCOM made extensive use of it during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. It proved to be a flexible and effective tool to schedule and track both units and cargo, and its utility for contingency operations - whether Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) or Military Operations - is not diminished by rapid deployments.

(2) (U) Force Selection was another concern. The haste to provide MSCA at the onset of relief operations may have resulted in units initially deployed to Florida that were less suited/equipped for this mission. This selection process ultimately required additional unit deployments and did not maximize force capabilities. Early deployment of a Plans Cell to augment the DCO/DCE/Damage Assessment Teams would help solve this problem. This element could recommend an optimal force structure, tailored to directed or implied missions. The end result - forces most appropriate for the mission, deployed at less cost, ready to respond in a most timely manner as expected by all concerned.

(3) (U) Another area of concern focused on the inordinate amount of time spent collecting information and preparing briefings for internal purposes, or for senior leader briefings in Washington, DC. The senior leadership at all levels needs timely and accurate decision matrix information. Future MSCA operations will require a Essential Elements of

Information/Other Information Requirements (EEI/OIR) section in alert/execute orders. This process should provide the information sufficient to cover 90% of decision information needs, assist in the preparation of required briefings, and allow staffs - at all levels - to concentrate on the tasks at hand, rather than accumulation of data.

--- (U) SUBJECT: OPERATIONS

--- (U) INTEROPERABILITY: JTTP

--- (U) Action managed by: DOMS, action worked by: , RAP number: . Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

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FORCES COMMAND

HURRICANE ANDREW RESPONSE

AFTER ACTION REPORT

PART 2

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 02261-07275 (00001), submitted by FORSCOM FCJ3, LTC Makowski, 367-6527, (404)669-6527.

2. (U) Operation HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF conducted by CINCFOR on 08/24/92.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: RWO (REAL WORLD OPS), USA (US ARMY), USAF (US AIR FORCE), USN (US NAVY), USMC (US MARINE CORPS), ADVERSE WEATHER, RESERVE COMPONENT, SPECIFIED COMMAND, OPERATIONS, SOF (SPECIAL OPS FORCES), LOGISTICS, SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM, SUMMARY, HURRICANE RELIEF, HURRICANE RESPONSE, TASK ORGANIZATION, DATES, OBJECTIVES, PARTICIPANTS.

4. (U) TITLE: SUMMARY - CINCFOR Hurricane Andrew Relief (Part 1 of 2 Parts).

5. (U) GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

a. (U) Hurricane Andrew was the nation's worst natural disaster in terms of financial loss and property damage. Hurricane Andrew came ashore in South Dade County, FL at 0500 Eastern Daylight Time, 24 August 1992. It continued across the southern tip of Florida and entered the Gulf of Mexico after devastating portions of Dade, Monroe, and Boward Counties. Upon entering the Gulf of Mexico, it turned north and again made landfall at Cypremort Point, vicinity of Morgan City, LA at 0400 Central Daylight Time, 26 August 1992.

b. (U) As a result of Hurricane Andrew destruction, the President declared a major disaster under the provisions of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 93-288, as amended). The Secretary of the Army, as the DOD Executive Agent, designated CINCFOR as the Operating Agent and Supported CINC for disaster relief operations in Florida and Louisiana. CINCFOR was given the mission to conduct disaster response operations, in support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in the states of Florida and Louisiana using military forces in support of all Federal Emergency Support Functions (ESF) except ESF 3. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is the lead DOD agency for ESF 3, Public Works and Engineering.

c. (U) USCINCLANT, USCINCSOC, and USCINCTRANS were designated Supporting CINCs. The Services were supporting.

d. (U) The Second Continental U. S. Army (CONUSA) (abbreviated USATWO) had responsibility for coordinating and controlling response operations in Florida until the establishment of Joint Task Force (JTF) Andrew by CINCFOR on 28 August 1992. JTF Andrew was formed using USATWO as its nucleus. JTF Andrew conducted relief and recovery operations until 15 October 1992. Lieutenant General Ebbesen, Commander

USATWO, was designated Commander, JTF Andrew. Upon the stand down of JTF Andrew, USATWO resumed responsibility for continuing operations.

e. (U) The Fifth U. S. Army (abbreviated USAFIVE) had responsibility for operations in Louisiana. Although hard hit by Hurricane Andrew, the damage was not as catastrophic as in Florida. Because of this, USAFIVE received few requests for support. LTG Jaco, CG, USAFIVE, was on the scene in Louisiana prior to hurricane reaching land. The Governor had activated his National Guard units prior to hurricane landfall. Although USAFIVE was prepared to respond, little support was required.

f. (U) Over 24,000 U. S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Canadian Forces deployed in the largest peacetime CONUS deployment to provided hurricane relief in Florida and Louisiana.

6. (U) DATES:

a. (U) Florida.

(1) (U) Deployment: The appointed Defense Coordinating Officer, COL Bob Lay, Commander, U. S. Army Readiness Group, Patrick AFB, FL, deployed 23 Aug 92 to the Florida Emergency Operations Center, Tallahassee, FL. Initial response forces deployed on 25 Aug 92. Last major unit deployment occurred 15 Sep 92.

(2) (U) Operations. 24 Aug 92 to 15 Oct 92.

(3) (U) Redeployment. First units were released from response operations and began redeploying 14 Sep 92. Last units redeployed 20 Oct 92.

b. (U) Louisiana. Response operations were conducted between 26 August and 9 September. No major units deployed, however, elements of units and individuals provided support.

7. (U) LOCATION OF OPERATIONS:

a. (U) In Florida, operations were centered in Dade County. Areas of concentration were south Miami's Cutler Ridge area, Homestead City, and Florida City.

b. (U) In Louisiana, operations were limited. Response was limited to supporting damage assessment efforts, transporting generator assessment teams, and providing emergency rations to the Red Cross.

8. (U) LOCATION OF PERSONNEL: In addition to above operational areas, forces were concentrated in Miami International Airport

area (JTF HQ and Army Material Command depot), Port of Miami (NAVFOR), West Palm Beach (logistic depot), Homestead AFB (ARFOR HQ and aerial port), Tamiami Airport (aerial port and aviation units), and Opa-Locka Airport (aviation units).

9. (U) OBJECTIVES:

a. (U) Provide immediate life support: food, potable water, shelter, medical services and supplies, sanitation, security, and transportation.

b. (U) Clear debris to open major road arteries and to remove debris threatening public health or safety.

c. (U) Assess needs of local population and governments for relief requirements.

d. (U) Provide help to other Federal agencies, State and local governments, and other organizations in the receipt, storage, and distribution of humanitarian supplies and equipment.

10. (U) LIMITATIONS:

a. (U) Military support to civil authorities is in support of civilian authorities. As such, military response is dictated by civilian requests and identified requirements. The Federal Coordinating Officer, Mr. Major P. May, was responsible for coordinating the federal, including the DOD, response effort. Being in support, rather then being in charge, constrained initial military response. Although requests for generators and emergency rations were received on 25 August, requests for forces were not received until 27 August.

b. (U) The initial air movement priority of 1B1 was in competition with other Unified and Specified Commands' operational requirements with the same priority. Subsequent upgrading of the priority to 1A3 alleviated this limitation.

11. (U) MAJOR PARTICIPANTS:

HQ, FORSCOM
USACE Prime Power Bn
USATWO
Defense Coord Officer/Defense Coord Elem
JTF Andrew
Army Forces (ARFOR)
HQ, XVIII Abn Corps
TF All American
Assault CP, 82d Abn Div
TF Falcon (2d Bde, 82d Abn Div)
TF 27 (DS) (Engr)

519th MP Bn (-)
Corps Support Gp (Prov) (DS)
TF Mountain
10th Mtn Div (LT) (-)
937th Engr Gp (DS)
841st Engr Bn (CBT) (USAR)
503d MP Bn (-) (DS)
507th CSG (-) (DS) (GS ARFOR)
18th Avn Bde
20th Engr Bde
16th MP Bde
35th Sig Bde
1st COSCOM
361st CA Bde (-) (USAR)
1st PSYOP Bn (-)
18th PSG (-)
18th CFG (-)
C/1-7 SFG (A) (-)
Special Troops Bn (-)
314th Press Camp HQ (-) (USAR)
USAMC Logistics Support Gp (Prov)
AMC Depot Cmd
80th OD Bn (-) (OPCON)
Navy Forces (NAVFOR)
TF 28
USS Sylvinia (AFS 2)
USS Ponce (LPD 15)
USS Hunley (AS 31)
USS Sierra (AD 18)
USS Opportune (ARS 41)
USS Ashland (LSD 48)
Naval Mobile Construction Bn 1 (Reinforced Air Det)
Naval Mobile Construction Bn 4 (Reinforced Air Det)
Naval Mobile Construction Bn 14 (Reinforced Air Det)
Construction Bn Unit 410
Construction Bn Unit 420
Construction Bn Unit 412
Construction Bn Unit 419
Amphibious Construction Bn 2
COMPHIBRON SIX
HC-8 (Embarked on USS Sylnania and USS Ponce)

--- (U) SUBJECT: OPERATIONS

--- (U) INTEROPERABILITY: JTTP

--- (U) Action managed by: DOMS, action worked by: , RAP number:
. Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

11/12/92

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 02261-23961 (00002), submitted by FORSCOM FCJ3, LTC Makowski, 367-6527, (404)669-6527.

2. (U) Operation HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF conducted by CINCFOR on 08/24/92.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: RWO (REAL WORLD OPS), USA (US ARMY), USAF (US AIR FORCE), USN (US NAVY), USMC (US MARINE CORPS), ADVERSE WEATHER, RESERVE COMPONENT, SPECIFIED COMMAND, TASK ORGANIZATION, OPERATIONS, SOF (SPECIAL OPS FORCES), LOGISTICS, SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM, SUMMARY, HURRICANE RELIEF, HURRICANE RESPONSE.

4. (U) TITLE: SUMMARY - CINCFOR Hurricane Andrew Relief (Part 2 of 2 Parts).

Marine Forces (MARFOR) (OPCON to ARFOR)
SPMAGTF
HQ, II MEF
2d MAR Div (-)
2d FSSG (-)
2d SRIG (-)
2d MAW (-)
CA Gp (-), 4th MARDIV (USMCR)
Air Forces (AFFOR)
31st TFW (Coordination)
301st ARR Sqdn
41st ARR Sqdn
Canadian Forces (CANFOR)
Canadian Combined TF
Airfield Engr Sqdn (-)
Mobile Repair Tm
HMCS Protectuer
USAFIVE
Defense Coord Officer/Defense Coord Elem
990th Med Det (AAMBL) (-) (USAR)

--- (U) SUBJECT: OPERATIONS

--- (U) INTEROPERABILITY: JTTP

--- (U) Action managed by: DOMS, action worked by: , RAP number: . Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 02261-33419 (00003), submitted by FORSCOM FCJ3, LTC Makowski, 367-6527, (404)669-6527.

2. (U) Operation HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF conducted by CINCFOR on 08/24/92.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: RWO (REAL WORLD OPS), USA (US ARMY), USAF (US AIR FORCE), USN (US NAVY), USMC (US MARINE CORPS), ADVERSE WEATHER, RESERVE COMPONENT, SPECIFIED COMMAND, OTHER AGENCIES, OPERATIONS, SOF (SPECIAL OPS FORCES), LOGISTICS, SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM, ASSESSMENT, LIFE SUPPORT CENTERS, HURRICANE RESPONSE, HURRICANE RELIEF.

4. (U) TITLE: ASSESSMENT - Provision of Immediate Life Support.

5. (U) OBSERVATION: The providing of immediate life support to victims of the hurricane was highly successful. When the President directed increased military support on 27 Aug 92, the rapid military response prevented great human suffering.

6. (U) DISCUSSION:

a. (U) Due to the primacy of civilian responsibility for disaster response, significant military response was delayed until 27 August. State officials responsible for disaster response initially underestimated the magnitude of the disaster and underestimated the ability of civilian agencies and local officials' ability to rapidly respond. As the magnitude of the disaster became known, the President, based on a request of the Governor, directed further military response. The President sent Secretary of Transportation, Mr. Card, to head a Presidential Task Force to oversee federal relief operations.

b. (U) Initial life support missions given to the military were to provide generators, 100,000 emergency rations (Meals Ready to Eat (MRE)), medical supplies to civilian Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT), and establishment of Life Support Centers (LSC).

c. (U) CINCFOR and the Chief of Staff of the Army conducted personal reconnaissances of the disaster area. Based on these reconnaissances and the broad mission taskings from the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), CINCFOR, in coordination with Mr. Card, directed the deployment of massive military support to the south Miami area. CINCFOR directed LTG Ebbesen, CG, USAFIVE, to form JTF Andrew. CINCFOR provided medical, engineer, signal, transportation, aviation, supply and service, labor (infantry), and maintenance units to the JTF for immediate response.

(1) (U) Twenty Mobile Kitchen Trailers (MKT) were deployed initially to provide meals to people who had little or nothing to eat since the hurricane. Over 50 MKTs were

subsequently deployed. These MKTs served 900,000 meals.

(2) (U) Four LSCs were established which provided mass care (food, water, shelter, sanitation, medical services, recreation, child care, and administrative services) for an average of 2400 disaster victims per day.

(3) (U) Combat units were deployed to establish contact with the disaster victims. They moved throughout the disaster area, in many cases going door-to-door, and made contact with disaster victims and local officials to determine community and neighborhood needs. These soldiers determined requirements, provided information on location of LSCs and MKTs, delivered emergency supplies, and provided emergency labor and first aid.

(4) (U) Military medicine played a major role in assisting civilians injured as a result of the hurricane. Military medical personnel treated 67,000 civilian patients. In addition to treating injuries or illness, military personnel provided veterinary care to large and small animals, water sampling support, preventative medicine, vector control, psychiatric crisis intervention, and medical logistics and organizational support.

(5) (U) Air Force Reserve C-130 aerial spray aircraft provided vector control over large portions of the disaster area.

(6) (U) Although not a specific mission for active and reserve military personnel, their mere presence in devastated areas provided a sense of security to local residents afraid of looters. Military personnel also established and manned traffic control points at key intersections to direct and control traffic in order to keep relief supplies, equipment, and services flowing. The freeing of Florida National Guard personnel from traffic control made them available for law enforcement missions.

7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: None. This lesson is an assessment.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: None required.

9. (U) COMMENTS: (02261-33419)

--- (U) SUBJECT: OPERATIONS

--- (U) INTEROPERABILITY: JTTP

--- (U) Action managed by: DOMS, action worked by: , RAP number: . Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

11/16/92

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 02261-35150 (00004), submitted by FORSCOM FCJ3, LTC Makowski, 367-6527, (404)669-6527.

2. (U) Operation HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF conducted by CINCFOR on 08/24/92.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: RWO (REAL WORLD OPS), USA (US ARMY), USAF (US AIR FORCE), USN (US NAVY), USMC (US MARINE CORPS), ADVERSE WEATHER, GUARD COMPONENT, RESERVE COMPONENT, SPECIFIED COMMAND, OPERATIONS, SOF (SPECIAL OPS FORCES), LOGISTICS, ENGINEERING, EQUIPMENT, SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM, DEBRIS REMOVAL, DEBRIS CLEARANCE, HURRICANE RELIEF, HURRICANE RESPONSE, ASSESSMENT.

4. (U) TITLE: ASSESSMENT - Debris Removal.

5. (U) OBSERVATION: The mission to clear debris from major arteries and to remove debris threatening public health or safety was fulfilled. Military engineers removed over 360,000 cubic yards of debris.

6. (U) DISCUSSION:

a. (U) Hurricane Andrew left an estimated 42 million cubic yards of debris. Most roads were blocked and most structures were destroyed. Broken telephone and power poles hanging by power lines, partially uprooted trees, and unstable structures threatened public safety. Piles of leaves, garbage, and other debris blocked drains and sewers. Debris also provided breeding places for insects and rodents capable of carrying disease.

b. (U) Initially, Florida Army National Guard (FLARNG) engineers cleared debris. The U. S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Jacksonville District began letting contracts for debris removal. However, the magnitude of the amount of debris overwhelmed their efforts.

c. (U) The 841st Engineer Battalion (USAR) was located in Miami, FL. As a wheeled corps combat engineer battalion it had dump trucks and bucket loaders needed for debris removal. However, Public Law 10 USC 673b prevented their involuntary call-up to active duty to perform disaster relief operations. As with all reserve component units, we had to rely upon volunteers for active duty. Out of 847 assigned personnel, 222 personnel volunteered for active duty. The number volunteering for active duty reflected the fact that many unit personnel were hurricane victims themselves. The 841st Engr Bn (-) was used to clear the runways and roadways of Homestead AFB so it could be used as an aerial port.

d. (U) Prior to the arrival of the Joint Task Force (JTF) engineers, the USACE contracted with local civilian contractors to begin debris removal. As military engineers arrived, they

aided in debris removal.

e. (U) Initial engineer debris removal operations were hindered by the lack of information on debris removal priorities. Due to lack of damage assessment surveys by engineer personnel and the inability to contact local officials to get their priorities, newly arrived units began debris removal operations based on their perceived priorities. In some cases, work was done in areas with low local government priority while high priority areas were delayed. In other cases, work overlapped work by local contractors and city, county, and state work crews.

f. (U) These problems were resolved with the appointing of the Commander of the North Central Division, Corps of Engineers as the JTF Engineer. His knowledge of and position within the USACE greatly aided the coordination of military engineers with the USACE. Since the USACE was responsible for Emergency Support Function 3, Public Works and Engineering, the USACE coordinated debris removal efforts of local governments, contractors, and military engineers. Personnel from the 36th Engr Gp comprised the JTF Engineer staff.

g. (U) The initial deploying engineer units from the XVIII Abn Corps were not well equipped for massive debris clearing. They did not have the dump trucks and bucket loaders needed for massive cleanup. However, they were rapidly deployable. They did a good job until heavier engineer units arrived. Ultimately, engineer units were augmented with over 170 leased dump trucks and 50 leased bucket loaders. Additionally, numerous chain saws were bought or leased to clear trees and power poles.

h. (U) From the beginning, the USACE had the lead on debris removal. Even by 4 September, 50% of all debris was being cleared by the USACE using contractors. By 18 September, all debris was being hauled by USACE contractors. This freed military engineers for military missions or other humanitarian missions such as building life support centers and repairing schools.

7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: None. This lesson is an assessment.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: None.

9. (U) COMMENTS: (02261-35150) See Joint Task Force Andrew After Action Report and Joint Universal Lessons Learned (JULLS) for further information on JTF engineer activities.

--- (U) SUBJECT: OPERATIONS

--- (U) INTEROPERABILITY: JTTP

--- (U) Action managed by: DOMS, action worked by: , RAP number: . Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 02254-95383 (00005), submitted by FORSCOM FCJ3, LTC Makowski, 367-6527, (404)669-6527.

2. (U) Operation HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF conducted by CINCFOR on 08/24/92.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: RWO (REAL WORLD OPS), USA (US ARMY), USAF (US AIR FORCE), USN (US NAVY), USMC (US MARINE CORPS), RESERVE COMPONENT, SPECIFIED COMMAND, OPERATIONS, SOF (SPECIAL OPS FORCES), LOGISTICS, SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM, ASSESSMENT.

4. (U) TITLE: ASSESSMENT - Assessing Needs of Local Population and Governments.

5. (U) OBSERVATION: The use of Division Ready Brigade (DRB) personnel and Special Operations Forces (SOF) Disaster Assistance Survey Teams (DAST) greatly aided in the determination of relief requirements and the allocation of limited resources.

6. (U) DISCUSSION:

a. (U) The extent of destruction in the disaster area was not uniform. The needs of different communities and neighborhoods differed. Wealthy neighborhoods were destroyed along with middle-class and working-class neighborhoods, migrant camps, and trailer camps. However, wealthy and middle-class neighborhoods required relatively little military support. These neighborhoods had the means to fend for themselves. The poorer neighborhoods with less substantial homes and the trailer parks suffered the greatest damage. They required more assistance.

b. (U) The challenge to determine "what was required where" was solved by having DRB personnel from the 82d Airborne and 10th Mountain Divisions canvass communities and neighborhoods on their needs and requirements. Units established command posts in communities and went door-to-door to determine requirements.

(1) (U) By establishing company size areas of responsibilities (AOR), units became knowledgeable of local needs. Going door-to-door allowed units to determine community requirements for life support. The flow of this information up through the chain of command allowed both military and civilian decision makers to make decisions on resource allocation based on facts. As conditions changed, decision makers had timely information how to reallocate resources.

(2) (U) By going door-to-door soldiers were also able to provide information to hurricane victims on locations of life support centers, mobile kitchen trailers (MKT), medical aid stations, and other essential information. In some cases, soldiers provided first aid. In other cases, soldiers aided

elderly and infirmed people to make emergency repairs to their homes that otherwise would not have been accomplished.

c. (U) A major benefit of having a highly visible presence in the communities and neighborhoods is the imparting in the disaster victims that their government had not abandoned them. Due to the initial, slow response by all levels of government, many communities felt abandoned. The presence of soldiers in their Battle Dress Uniforms (BDU) going door-to-door and living in their communities showed them they were not abandoned. An additional benefit was the deterring effect on looters. While law enforcement was not a mission, a visible military presence had a deterring effect on crime.

7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: None. This lesson is an assessment.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: None.

9. (U) COMMENTS: (02254-95383)

--- (U) SUBJECT: OPERATIONS

--- (U) INTEROPERABILITY: JTTP

--- (U) Action managed by: DOMS, action worked by: , RAP number: . Lesson distributed by: FLLP.

--- (U) SUBJECT: LOGISTICS

--- (U) INTEROPERABILITY: JTTP

--- (U) Action managed by: DOMS, action worked by: , RAP number: . Lesson distributed by: FLLP.



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Veterinary: Organization of the State effort in care of both large and small animals injured or displaced by the hurricane was facilitated by the early arrival of Army veterinary specialists who coordinated local, State, and national agencies in establishing immediate response programs and the return to more normal sources of veterinary care.

Dental: Limited military dental care for the civilian populace was required as public and private dental care was available.

All of the functional areas were integrated with appropriate members of the State health agencies who were encouraged to take lead positions. The presence of a single senior DOD medical point of contact participating daily in a cooperative fashion with the PHS lead allowed the functional experts to guide the civilian relief and recovery efforts.

d. LOGISTICS: Enormous amounts of food and water, shelter, and medical supplies required to provide immediate relief of the human suffering experienced by victims of Hurricane Andrew presented a challenge in receipt, storage, and distribution of supplies. Although no specific logistics doctrine for disaster relief existed, the JTF was able to modify existing logistics guidance to accomplish the mission. The initial logistics challenge was met by the 1st COSCOM, XVIII ABN Corps, for distribution of humanitarian relief supplies while concurrently supporting deployed Corps soldiers. As the flow of humanitarian supplies increased it became apparent that an expanded depot system was required for receipt, storage, and distribution of both donated and Federal goods. The U.S. Army Materiel Command formed a Logistics Support Group (LSG) to establish and operate this system, streamlining the distribution of supplies. The LSG began the operation of a main depot and two forward depots for receipt, storage, and issue of donated and Federal goods.

We learned that contracting should commence immediately for those items that Federal agencies could not provide or supply in the quantities required, i.e., reefer vans, ice, dumpsters, and porto-lets. Critical factors to be considered for initial logistics operations for disaster relief are the availability, locations, and selection of aerial ports of debarkation, their distance from the relief area, storage capability, and the logistics infrastructure required to move incoming supplies. The capability of the U.S. Navy to provide immediate humanitarian relief and logistics support is vital for disaster operations conducted in coastal areas. The U.S. Navy's efforts in the supply of food in support of U.S. Army Mobile Kitchen Trailers (MKTs) were a major contribution to the disaster relief effort and served as a critical component of the JTF's logistical operations.

e. COMMUNICATIONS AND AUTOMATION: On 25 Aug 92, Second U.S. Army deployed a communications team via C-12 to the Defense Coordinating Element's (DCE) home station (Patrick Air Force Base, Melbourne, FL) to join up with the DCE's main body for further deployment to Miami,FL. They deployed with a cellular telephone, one portable facsimile machine, three High Frequency (HF) radios, 5 hand-held VHF radios, one mobile 30-watt VHF radio, one VHF base station, 3 UHF hand-held radios, one generator, and one laptop computer with external drive and printer. The next day the DFO was designated as the former Eastern Airlines Office building in Miami and the deployable communications team and equipment relocated there. We learned immediately on arrival in the disaster area that the existing communications packages were inadequate. It is clear that to ensure this inadequacy is addressed that CONUSAs must have access to robust communications packages that are quickly deployable and provide commanders with instantaneous communications upon arrival at a disaster location. To further address the initial communications inadequacies, Commanders, JTFA, ARFOR, AFFOR, NAVFOR, and MARFOR established UHF TACSAT stations in the CINCFOR's command net. FEMA and the JTF began requesting commercial communications to facilitate the immediate relief response. With JTF assistance, the DFO immediately received commercial telephone communications. In the relief phase, the JTF focused on providing both commercial and tactical communications to units setting up Disaster Assistance Centers (DAC), Depots, Life Support Centers (LSC), and Mobile Kitchen Trailers (MKT). Simultaneously, tactical and commercial communications were established to the JTF HQs. Establishment of the Joint Message Center and printing of a daily updated JTF telephone directory enhanced early coordination.

The JTF enhanced the initial start up and operation of Command and Control Communications (C3) by adhering to a few key points. Tactical organic communications were the initial means for internal C3 and links back to higher headquarters and the support base. The JTF used both single and multichannel satellite to establish this link.

To support their key role in disaster relief, Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) units needed additional tactical radios and telephones to give them a more robust communications capability. Although commercial telephone communications were almost totally inoperative due to lines and poles being torn down, the telephone central offices and fiber optic trunks between them survived. When commanders located their command posts (CP) near these telephone central offices they obtained commercial telephone access rapidly. JTF units used cellular telephone when available, but did not rely upon it as the sole means. As the recovery continued, the JTF replaced tactical C3 with commercial telephone. Signal units correctly established connections between the tactical and commercial

telephone systems as quickly as feasible. As the commercial telephone network recovered, units incrementally removed tactical telephones.

f. ENGINEER OPERATIONS AND SUSTAINMENT: When Hurricane Andrew passed through southern Florida destroying public utilities and thousands of structures, it left an estimated 42 million cubic yards of debris. The operation saw the largest joint and combined engineer force (Army, Air Force and Marine Corps engineers; Navy Seabees; Canadian Air Force engineers; and United States Army Corps of Engineer civilian employees and contractors) ever assembled to combat the destruction.

The first engineers on the scene were FLARNG followed closely by employees of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Jacksonville District) and the 841st Engineer Battalion (U.S. Army Reserve) from Miami. The Jacksonville District personnel immediately went to work to remove debris to open roads and let contracts to provide water, ice, and porto-lets. The 841st Engineer Battalion, utilizing volunteer soldiers, cleared roads and the runways of Homestead Air Force Base. The military engineer force grew to over 3,500 personnel and the Jacksonville District expanded to over 600 Army employees and 4,000 contractor personnel.

Over 2,500 Army engineers of the 20th Engineer Brigade cleared roads and runways; removed debris; built Life Support Centers; provided generators; supplied food, water, and sanitation facilities; and cleared school yards along with performing other engineer tasks. Navy Seabees, operating under the leadership of the 22d Naval Construction Regiment, repaired 48 Dade County schools in addition to debris removal, public facility roof repairs, and traffic signal restoration. Marine Corps engineers operating as part of the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) built and ran Life Support Centers, installed power poles, and removed debris. Air Force engineers concentrated on clearing debris and supporting operations at Homestead AFB.

Canadian Air Force engineers repaired schools, removed debris, and provided support to the Prime Power Engineer Battalion. The USACE Prime Power Engineer Battalion provided generator support to the Northwest Wellfield (Miami's largest source of water) and to numerous other facilities and organizations. The Jacksonville District (USACE) provided not only immediate response support but quickly moved to long term recovery operations with nearly $400 million in contractual authority under ESF #3 for debris removal, roof repair, school repair, trailer court clearing, etc.

Military engineers filled the gap until contractors, volunteer relief organizations, and local communities could be

mobilized to carry on with disaster recovery. Appointing a USACE Division Engineer as the JTF Engineer and using an active duty Engineer Group as the JTF Engineer staff ensured the synchronization of the USACE (ESF-3) and JTF engineer effort.

USACE's contractual capability reinforced and complemented the military engineer effort in the early stages of recovery and ultimately allowed military engineers to disengage as private contractors came on line.

Six lessons learned were: (1) Engineer forces flowed into the area of operations based on individual service component estimates of what was needed rather than an accurate engineer reconnaissance and assessment. Had an accurate engineer assessment been accomplished in the first 12-24 hours of the disaster, synchronized engineer recovery effort could have been brought to bear much earlier. (2) Class IV push packages for disasters need to be developed as very little construction material is available in an area hit by a disaster. (3) The appropriate USACE Division Engineer should become the JTF Engineer and the nearest active duty Engineer Group should provide the JTF Engineer staff. (4) Seabees were particularly effective because of the high level of construction skills available in their organization. Ships' crews constitute an extremely valuable work force in complementing the engineers because of their ability to work from a ship and not have to expend effort in establishing an operating base. (5) Marine Corps Engineers train on setting up base camps and are much more experienced in this operation than other engineer organizations. (6) The ability to supplement TO&E authorizations with rental equipment in domestic disasters greatly enhances their organic capabilities.

g. MILITARY POLICE/PHYSICAL SECURITY: The Florida Army National Guard was not federalized and this enabled the Guard to conduct the mission of law enforcement operations. Federal law (18 USC 1385, commonly known as the Posse Comitatus Act) and/or regulatory authority, however, prohibits active component military personnel from participating in civilian law enforcement activities. Thus, active duty personnel were free to concentrate on the relief and recovery mission. This split of duties based on law and regulation worked well for both missions. Military Police support was provided by the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and the Florida Army National Guard. Military Police assets, both Active Component and Army National Guard, must be among the first assets deployed to a disaster area. The fact that Army National Guard assets were not federalized facilitated enforcement of civilian laws in the affected area. Active component military police provided traffic control (but only where such activity was in furtherance of a military purpose, e.g., facilitating the movement of military convoy traffic), are and route reconnaissance, security of military equipment and

supplies, force protection, discipline, and VIP security. This allowed Army National Guard forces to concentrate on assisting civil authorities with law enforcement missions. Command emphasis on physical security kept theft and loss of Government equipment extremely low.

It is imperative that MP Liaison Officers be assigned for coordination with local civil authorities and Army National Guard MP units especially when there is a shortage of compatible communications equipment.

h. JOINT AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT: With the amount of air activity associated with disaster relief, a Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) is needed to support JTF operations. The JAOC should have a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), whose staff, consisting of members of the joint services and Reserve Components, would coordinate with FEMA personnel and the aviation departments of local law enforcement and fire/rescue personnel to ensure joint operating procedures are established for disaster area operations. The JFACC would coordinate with the local FAA officials and in cases where the FAA facilities and equipment had been destroyed or damaged the JAOC could assume command and control of the disaster area airspace by employing Air Force Combat Control Teams and Mobile Air Traffic Control Equipment from Air Force Combat Communications Squadrons.

In the absence of a JAOC, the airspace management procedures were developed after a meeting between Joint Forces and the FAA with representatives from the Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard, and the Florida Army and Air National Guard. Operations in support of disaster relief within urban areas in CONUS are not addressed in Joint Air Doctrine. Of paramount importance was the immediate Notice To Airmen (NOTAM) distribution to XVIII ABN Corps, Flight Ops Centers, Navy Forces, FAA, and non-JTF aviation units.

The Navy coordinated with the FAA to obtain a waiver to sling load food and supplies over populated areas to facilitate the operation of Mobile Kitchen Trailers in the disaster area. Future disaster relief operations of this nature call for an Aviation Safety Officer as an integral part of the JAOC.

i. JOINT TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS AND SUSTAINMENT: A combination of air, land, and sea movements provided essential transportation for the DOD forces, disaster victims, and relief workers. The initial absence of a Joint Movement Control Center (JMCC) was a hindrance. Future operations should activate a JMCC immediately, along with a Joint Transportation Office (JTO), thereby enhancing the capability to make commercial transportation arrangements. Contingency planners should also consider a U.S. Transportation Command LNO. This LNO would coordinate with the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and Air Mobility Command (AMC).

Two systems designed to support deployments did not receive a great deal of use. The Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the Transportation Coordinator Automated Command and Control Information System (TCACCIS) should be studied for the purpose of better applicability to a disaster area. This also justifies the immediate emplacement of World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) capability.

j. PAO/PIO OPERATIONS: The Joint Task Force Public Affairs Office was established on 27 August 1992 and collocated with the JTF Command Group and staff. This facilitated both interaction with the Command Group and staff coordination. The JTF PAO focused on advising the JTF commander on all aspects of Public Affairs (PA), planned strategy for the three phases of the military relief effort, and the preparation of remarks for the JTF commander and Secretary of Transportation to use at press conferences. The JTF PAO also prepared high-visibility press releases, e.g., on force adjustments, for release through the Presidential Task Force's Joint Information Center (JIC), arranged media interviews with the Command Group, and planned Command Group public appearances.

PA planning was centralized, and the PA activity was proactive. Media coverage of JTFA activities, to include force adjustments, was encouraged.

The Deputy JTF PAO was located in the JIC as both the JTF PAO's representative and the senior Army representative to that organization. The JTF PAO met almost daily with the Presidential Task Force press secretary and the JIC director to plan and coordinate public affairs strategy and activities. The JTF PAO provided U.S. Army Reserve volunteers to operate the major functions of the JIC.

The establishment of the Joint Information Center under the auspices of the DOT Presidential Task Force on 1 September 1992 was vital to a coordinated and successful Joint Public Affairs effort. The JIC was an "umbrella" organization that served as the clearing house for dissemination of hurricane relief information to the news media. More than ten federal agencies involved in relief operations had public affairs representatives at the JIC. Daily meetings and consistent interaction among the agencies involved resulted in a coordinated federal information effort.

The key to the JIC's successful media relations operation was the presence of the 314th Press Camp Headquarters (USAR). The unit was responsible for the operations, administration, and logistical support of the JIC. Unit members responded to media queries, performed media escort, coordinated with various agency representatives, provided daily news clips, prepared media briefing materials, and maintained the media briefing room.

At the outset of the emergency, daily media briefings were held at the JIC. These were conducted by the Director of the Presidential Task Force and the JTF Commander. Over time, briefings were scaled back to two per week. Input for all briefings and all press releases were coordinated through the JIC Operations Section thereby ensuring quality and consistency.

k. TRANSITION (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN): It was apparent at the outset of this complex, non-doctrinal humanitarian relief mission that it was necessary in the beginning to visualize the end result of the JTF's disaster relief effort. Transition planning was initiated immediately on arrival to ensure the earliest capability of State, county, and municipal authorities to regain control of essential supplies and services in the disaster area.

The critical factor in the transition process was the ability to measure the success of operations in Phases I and II. This analysis was conducted using indicators built around the following:

(1) Reestablishment of State and local government's capacity to provide essential public services;

(2) Civilian community knowledgeable that DOD can/will respond quickly to provide emergency needs and not leave until the job is complete; and,

(3) "Soldiers" feel pride in their accomplishments.

An assessment process was designed to analyze our success relative to the above criteria. Examples of the assessment process are at enclosures 3, 3(cont), 4, and 5.

In such an emergency the coordination of the transition must be extremely comprehensive to ensure there is no premature disengagement of a DOD element and that it is not perceived that we are abandoning the relief effort. The transition process must cause careful analysis of all missions and functions being accomplished by DOD.

The assessment process of the transition analysis requires detailed coordination with the Presidential Task Force, if established, FEMA, State and local officials, public affairs, and higher headquarters. (enclosure 6)

Once DOD missions are completed under the above analysis, units and soldiers should be immediately released and redeployed to home station.

It is equally clear that this process was correct, effective, success oriented and right to serve as a future model for any major DOD involvement in CONUS disaster relief.

l. JTF FUNCTIONS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT: The organization of the JTF was an evolutionary process. Initial proposed organizational structure and task organizations were driven by ambiguous DOD force requirements for response operations, exacerbated by incomplete damage assessments. Normally, mission taskings from the DCO/DCE based on FEMA liaison would have driven the force structure requirements for DOD response. However, once the President directed an increased DOD role on 27 August 1992 the organization of the JTF was a reaction to both DOD directives and FEMA liaison. The creation of a JTF to support humanitarian assistance for a catastrophic disaster in CONUS had never been attempted. During this stage of expansion the JTF was able to continue analyzing the required structure for the JTF headquarters while providing command and control for the increasing numbers of deploying joint forces.

The addition of joint Flag Officers to the JTF headquarters proved invaluable to joint service interoperability and is a requirement in future disaster relief operations. The interchange of service unique knowledge, operational procedures, mission capabilities, coupled with the highest degree of professionalism, enhanced the overall mission accomplishment.

m. ACCOUNTABILITY: Judicious management and accountability of government resources was an early and constant focus for the JTF. Key operational and logistics decisions and actions were preceded by analysis. Examples of actions and processes which contributed to positive resource management were:

(1) Designation of professional logistics organization to receipt, store, issue, and account for DOD materiel, i.e., Army Materiel Command (AMC).

(2) Deliberate decisions to obtain early on-site involvement and advice from external functional experts, i.e., Army Audit Agency (AAA), Government Accounting Office (GAO), and FORSCOM IG.

(3) Establishment of a resource management directorate, i.e., J-8, to review procedures and advise the commander.

(4) Maximize visibility and tracking of forces and their mission, including an analytical "force adjustment" process to release units when possible to do so. (Enclosure 6 & 7)

(5) Careful linking of resource expenditures to FEMA mission taskings.

(6) Contract equipment and services as required, but terminate contracts incrementally as soon as possible.

Future DOD disaster response operations must establish an environment early-on which facilitates effective conservation of government resources. This imperative could easily be overlooked during deployment into a disaster area; but, as JTF Andrew demonstrated, leaders will succeed if they make the commitment up front.

n. SAFETY: The JTF was extremely proactive during this entire operation. Commanders at all levels made safety a priority resulting in a remarkable low number of accidents and injuries. Working in the tropical heat of south Florida posed risks to troops not acclimated to southern climates. Hot weather precautions proved adequate to prevent heat injuries. The safety messages and pamphlets published by the Safety Office highlighted policies and procedures designed to protect the soldier, sailor, airman, and marine in a disaster environment, i.e., downed power lines, no traffic signals, use of unfamiliar equipment, etc. The exchange of safety information among components provided the impetus for a safer environment.

Enclosures

1. DOD Organization/Relationships
2. JTFA Staff Organization
~~2a. JTFA Staff Directory~~
~~3. Phase I Assessment Process~~
~~4. Phase II Assessment Process~~
~~5. Revitalization Indicators - Assessment Process~~
~~6. Transition Process Methodology~~
~~7. Force Adjustment Process~~

Encl 2


AS OF: 11 SEP 92
TOTAL FORCE
ARMY- 513
NAVY- 36
AIR FORCE- 19
USMC- 10
CIVILIANS- 14
TOTAL- 592
JTFA CDR
OFF: 2
ENL: 1
LTG SAMUEL E. EBBESEN
AIDE MAJ KUMACK
DEP JTF CDR
OFF: 2
ENL: 1
MG DENNIS V. CRUMLEY
AIDE CPT OSBORNE
PERSONAL STAFF
CHAPLAIN
OFF: 16
ENL: 11
COL MANGHAM
ARMY- 27
PAO
OFF: 21
ENL: 48
CIV: 1
COL BUSCH
ARMY- 69 NAVY- 4
AF- 6 USMC-1
CIV- 1
SJA
OFF: 4
COL MOUSHEGIAN
ARMY- 4
Chief of Staff
OFF: 3
MG RICHARD B. GRIFFITTS
DEPUTY COL POPHAM
AIDE CPT NELSON
SJS
OFF: 8
ENL: 13
CIV: 1
LTC WOODWARD
ARMY- 21 NAVY- 1 CIV- 1
COORDINATING STAFF
J1
OFF: 11
ENL: 12
CIV: 3
RADM THOMAS A. DAMES
DEPUTY COL MOSELEY
ARMY- 20 NAVY- 3 CIV- 3
J2
TBD
J3
OFF: 40
ENL: 32
BG RANDOLPH W. HOUSE
DEPUTY COL THURMAN
DEPUTY COL SCHMIDT
ARMY- 67 NAVY- 2
AF- 2 USMC- 1
J4
OFF: 35
ENL: 30
CIV: 2
MG THOMAS W. ROBISON
DEPUTY BG GEORGE R. GRAY
ARMY- 69 NAVY- 4 CIV- 2
J5
OFF: 15
ENL: 8
RADM KARL KAUP
DEPUTY PLANS COL DUNN
DEPUTY CMO COL DORSEY
ARMY- 20 NAVY- 4
J6
OFF: 32
ENL: 107
BG ROBERT E. WYNN
DEPUTY COL DOWNEY
ARMY-133 NAVY-2
AF- 2 USMC- 2
J8
OFF: 3
ENL: 1
COL DAVID SANDT
DEPUTY LTC(P) KRIENER
ARMY-4
SPECIAL STAFF
ARFOR LNO
OFF: 2
ENL: 1
LTC KEEN
ARMY-3
AFFOR LNO
OFF: 0
COL CREIGHTON
AIR FORCE- 8
USMC LNO
OFF: 3
ENL: 1
LTC VERZERA
USMC- 4
NAVFOR LNO
OFF: 13
ENL: 2
CAPT WILLIAMS
NAVY- 14
USMC- 1
ENG
OFF: 24
ENL: 44
CIV: 6
BG RUSSEL L. FUHRMAN
DEPUTY COL ANDERSON
ARMY- 84 NAVY- 1
AF-2 USMC-1
CIV- 6
SURGEON
OFF: 8
ENL: 5
CIV: 1
BG JAMES B. PEAKE
SMA COL RITCHIE
ARMY- 12 NAVY- 1
AF-1 CIV- 1

Encl 1


DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HON MICHAEL STONE
GEN GORDON SULLIVAN
CINCFOR
GEN EDWIN BURBA
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE
HON ANDREW CARD
JTF ANDREW
COMMANDER
LTG SAMUEL EBBESEN
DCO
COL LAY
FEMA
PHIL MAY
GOVERNOR OF FLORIDA
HON L. CHILES
DEPUTY COMMANDER
MG CRUMLEY
JOINT TASK FORCE STAFF
MG GRIFFITTS
FLORIDA NATIONAL GUARD
MG HARRISON
ARFOR
LTG LUCK
NAVFOR
CAPT WILLIAMS
USAMC
MG ARWOOD
MARFOR
COL RODRIGUEZ
AFFOR
BG GRAY
CANFOR
CAPT McCLEAN